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Abstract 
 
Why did East and Central European countries decide to join NATO after the Warsaw Pact dissolved? This article analyzes 
NATO expansion from the perspective of the Central and East European applicants for NATO membership. Contrary to the 
expectations of neo-realist scholars support for NATO membership was costly to build, particularly in Central and East 
European countries where the perception of threat from Russia was low. The historical evidence I examine indicates that in the 
early 1990s it was not apparent what post-Cold War security arrangement would best suit the needs of the former Warsaw Pact 
allies. For the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Balkan countries, which had not experienced or been threatened by Soviet 
invasion, NATO membership was neither a clear choice nor the only security option they could pursue. NATO’s adaptation and 
expansion challenges neo-realist expectations and supports arguments advanced by neo-liberal institutionalists and 
constructivists. 
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“To admit countries into NATO would be tantamount to pledging that the United States would fight in their defense. Are 
we really willing to do this? Why would we? How many of us are willing to die – or to have our children die – in an East 
European war?” (Robert Jervis)1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Despite the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
did not cease to exist. Why did post-communist countries decide to join the alliance2 after its raison d’être – an imminent 
Soviet military threat - vanished? Alliance dissolution was a conceivable outcome: NATO could have shared the destiny 
of the Warsaw Pact and disappeared (Bertram, 1997). 3 Its adaptation, through eastward expansion, has presented 
scholars with a puzzle for two reasons. First, between 1991 and 1999, there were divisions among the member states 
which could have caused NATO’s demise (Kaufman, 2002). Two of these divisive issues were NATO enlargement and 
involvement in Balkan ethnic strife (Sloan, 1995).4 Second, instead of dissolving, the alliance expanded to include former 
communist countries that were members of the defunct Warsaw Pact – NATO’s military adversary during the Cold War. 
I argue that contrary to the expectations of scholars such as Robert Jervis, Charles Kupchan, and Andrew Kydd 
political support for NATO membership was costly to build in post-communist Europe. The historical evidence I examine 
indicates that between 1990 and 1992 it was not apparent what post Cold War security arrangement would best suit the 
needs of the former Warsaw Pact allies. For the Balkan countries, which had not experienced or been threatened by 
Soviet invasion, NATO membership was neither a clear choice nor the only security option. 
In many Central and East European countries, former communists were reincarnated as social democrats and 
staged a political comeback by forming their own cabinets and dominating the legislative process. NATO expansion east 
of the “Iron Curtain” refutes neo-realists’ expectations about post-Cold War security developments in Europe. I provide a 
                                                                            
1 Robert Jervis. “Legacies of the Cold War” The Brown Journal of Foreign Affairs (Summer 1995) p. 25 
2 I follow Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander’s typology and treat NATO as an alliance - a “highly institutionalized security coalition 
directed against a specific threat.”  The authors present their typology of security institutions in the edited volume Imperfect Unions: 
Security Institutions Over Time and Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. pp. 26-28 
3 Bertram argues that the adaptation of NATO as a Euro-Atlantic security network was not the only collective security option national 
leaders could pursue after the end of the Cold War. 
4 Sloan argues that NATO’s involvement in the Bosnian conflict “has raised the question of whether NATO remains relevant to the 
security challenges of the post-Cold War world.” (p. 226) 
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domestic level explanation which sheds light on the strategic and ideological concerns of post-communist countries in the 
area of foreign policy. Post-communist countries applied for NATO membership because 1) ex-communist governments 
lost parliamentary and governmental control or 2) ex-communists changed their foreign policy position in order to attract 
electoral support from their constituents. Had the ex-communist governments stayed in power and refused to change 
their foreign policy positions, expansion of NATO would either not have occurred or would have stopped with the 
admission of Poland. 
 
2. Neo-Realists vs. Neo-liberal Institutionalists on Alliance Expansion 
 
NATO expansion has animated the debate between neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists. Neo-realists anticipated 
NATO’s demise. Mearsheimer, for example, argued that with the decline of the Soviet threat, international security 
organizations5 such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact would decay.6 In the neo-realist framework, Mearsheimer argues that 
alliances are simply “temporary marriages of convenience” (p. 11). If the security threat that an alliance is supposed to 
counter wanes or disappears, the alliance should naturally dissolve. Neo-liberal institutionalists argued otherwise. In the 
words of Wallander, Haftendorn and Keohane , “the end of the cold war has supported institutionalist hypotheses: not 
only have quite a few security institutions persisted, some (such as NATO) have even acquired new functions” (p. 5) 
The fact that NATO not only survived but is also expanding by accepting Central and East European countries in 
its ranks has attracted scholarly attention in recent years. Exploring the reasons for NATO’s staying power and expansion 
will improve our understanding of the adaptation mechanisms of security alliances. Moreover, few scholars have taken 
interest in the foreign policy formulation processes of the aspiring NATO members, all of which are now democracies. 
The focus of this article is two-fold. First, I discuss the larger issue of alliance expansion by examining two theoretical 
strands – liberal institutionalism and neo-realism. I evaluate the use of the two theoretical strands in explaining NATO 
adaptation and expansion from the perspective of the prospective members. Second, I analyze the decisions of Poland, 
Bulgaria, and Romania to apply for membership in the alliance. I was prompted to study the Bulgarian foreign policy 
process because public and political support for NATO membership in Bulgaria was consistently low between 1990 and 
1995 and rose between 1997 and 2001.7 Pro-NATO politicians engaged in a Sisyphean effort to popularize the idea of 
NATO membership. The case of Poland exemplifies the role of systemic factors, such as the perception of threat, in a 
country’s decision to join a security alliance. The case of Romania illustrates how electoral incentives lead to changes in 
incumbents’ foreign policy position. 
I discuss the issue of Bulgarian and Romanian admission to NATO and enlargement because acceptance of 
Balkan countries in the alliance brought to light political concerns among foreign policy makers in the United States and 
the other NATO members. Policymakers were worried that by admitting the Balkan countries, the alliance would inherit 
these countries’ inter-ethnic conflicts. The controversies surrounding expansion could have destabilized the alliance but 
they did not (Kaufman 2002). Moreover, there was a perception among international relations scholars that the decision 
of former communist countries to join NATO would be welcome as manna from heaven by constituents without creating 
internal divisions in Central and East European societies. Charles Kupchan, for example, notes that “the countries of 
central and eastern Europe are looking ardently west, hoping to find a home inside NATO’s eastern boundary” (p. 112). 
Robert Jervis contends that “Russia and the other countries of Eastern and Central Europe desire nothing more than 
inclusion in the Western world – socially, economically, and politically” (p. 26). Andrew Kydd states that “the least 
puzzling part of NATO enlargement is the desire of the East European states to join the alliance” (p. 804). Understanding 
the rationale of Central and East European countries for joining NATO is important in light of Kenneth Waltz’s balance of 
                                                                            
5 John Mearsheimer follows John Ruggie in drawing a distinction between institutions and organizations.  In Mearsheimer’s language 
NATO is an organization because it has its own personnel, budget, and buildings.  The institutionalist literature, however, sometimes 
refers to NATO both as a security organization and an institution.  See John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International 
Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995): pp. 9-10 
6 John Mearsheimer. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), 
pp. 6-7  Mearsheimer asserts the high likelihood of NATO’s decay in his rejoinder to criticism leveled at “The False Promise of 
International Institutions.”  He argues that international organizations of NATO’s caliber cannot effectively deal with security threats 
because the international system encourages states to behave as short-term rather than long-term power maximizers. See “A Realist 
Reply” in International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995): pp. 82-93. 
7 Bulgaria was one of the few Central and East European countries where support for NATO membership was extremely low until very 
recently.  In 1995 Bulgarian public opinion was divided on the issue of NATO membership.  The pro-membership group had slight 
advantage in the public opinion polls – approximately 5%.  As of 2003, public support for NATO membership in Bulgaria was 65%, lower 
than support in the other second-wave applicant countries. 
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power theory (Waltz, 1979). NATO enlargement challenges Waltz’s predictions that small states will engage in power-
balancing by allying with the weaker power, in this case Russia. The small Central and East European states have 
favored the bandwagon of the Atlantic Alliance rather than Russian patronage. Thus, the post-Cold War international 
security outcome we have witnessed through NATO expansion is consistent with Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat 
argument, which predicts bandwagoning (Walt, 1998). There is little convincing evidence, however, indicating that post-
communist countries saw Russia as a source of security threat in the 1990s. Thus, Walt’s theoretical proposition is 
consistent with the outcome but not the cause of expansion. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War it was not clear what international security arrangements would best 
suit the interests of former communist countries. It is important, in this regard, to note that all of the former communist 
countries signed bilateral cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union (or Russia) between 1990 and 1992. Contrary to 
Kupchan’s and Jervis’s conjecture, in the early 1990s it was far from obvious that Central and East European countries 
would seek association or membership in NATO. Some ex-communist governments faced significant obstacles in 
creating consensus in favor of NATO membership. In at least one of the countries – Bulgaria - foreign policy makers had 
to fight an uphill battle to build legislative support for NATO membership. 
In the eyes of Western policy makers and international relations scholars, the decisions of Central and Eastern 
European countries to join NATO should have been uncontentious, attracting little political opposition. In the minds of the 
Western architects of NATO enlargement, the positive net benefits of membership should have been obvious to 
constituents and political leaders in Central and Eastern Europe. Scholars have overlooked the vacillation, indifference, 
and opposition to NATO membership in post-communist Europe. The impressionistic accounts of the internal ratification 
processes inside ex-communist countries are based on superficial and easily available evidence – mostly speeches 
made by these countries’ presidents. Many of these presidents – Lech Waáesa (Poland), Vaçlav Havel (Czech Republic), 
and Zhelyu Zhelev (Bulgaria) - were political dissidents during the Communist era and their statements did not 
necessarily represent the sentiments of most of their countries’ legislators or voters.8 There have been few serious 
attempts to examine the ratification inside these countries’ legislatures (Mattox & Rachwald, 2001). In this paper, I 
present evidence which demonstrates that NATO membership was not the only possible way of filling in the security 
vacuum which emerged with the demise of the Warsaw Pact. 
 
3. NATO’s Persistence After the Cold War 
 
Robert McCalla (1996) has addressed the question of NATO’s persistence after the end of the Cold War. He argues that 
even though neo-realist theories explain alliance formation, they do not provide a good insight into alliance adaptation 
and expansion. International institutionalist theories, he contends, conceive of NATO as “part of a broad multilevel and 
multi-issue relationship among member states” and are thus good at explaining NATO’s persistence (p. 445). Neo-realist 
theory offers little insight into NATO’s adaptation and prospects for survival. In a neo-realist vein, Gibler (1999) has 
argued that NATO expansion will magnify the risk of conflict in Europe, particularly in case Russia becomes marginalized 
and forced to observe NATO’s expansion as an outsider. Gibler’s skepticism has been corroborated only recently after 
Russia annexed Crimea and clearly demonstrated territorial ambitions toward other parts of Ukraine.9 
Sandler (1999) uses a cooperative game theoretic framework to explain alliance formation and expansion. 
Alliances survive, he argues, because they provide members with gains from mutual defense. The amount of these gains 
depends on the spatial and locational attributes of the allies. The goal of Sandler’s model was to predict which countries 
are likely to enter NATO after the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. The model, however, did not offer an accurate 
prediction about the direction of NATO’s expansion. Sandler argued that the Baltic countries and Romania were unlikely 
entrants because their inclusion would not make a sufficient contribution to mutual defense. Contrary to his expectations, 
however, the Baltic countries and Romania were indeed invited to begin accession talks in late November 2002. Other 
                                                                            
8 See Jonathan Eyal’s article “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision,” International Affairs. (1997) Vol. 73, No. 4: 695-719.  Eyal 
makes references to the “persistent demands of the east Europeans to join the alliance” (p. 703). 
9 Russian efforts to be taken as a serious international actor crystallized in a 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 
Security with NATO.  This document explicitly stated that Russia and NATO are not adversaries and will cooperate toward the 
achievement of a common goal of European security.  Russia had become a desirable partner because it had reduced its military forces 
significantly, withdrawn from the Baltic countries and Central Europe, and made a commitment to reduce its conventional and nuclear 
weapons.  To become a partner to a military alliance, Russia had to relinquish some of its military capacity.  The good neighbor foreign 
policy espoused by President Putin led to the NATO-Russia Council, an outgrowth of the Founding Act.  The Council was created in an 
atmosphere of a palpable security challenge after the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. The full text of the Founding Act can be 
accessed at NATO’s official website at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm .   
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Balkan countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia were not included in his set of predictions. Sandler’s model 
relied on a definition of NATO as a mutual defense alliance. Such conceptualization omits an important mission of the 
alliance, namely its leadership’s attempt to further the democratization process in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
precursor to NATO expansion – the Partnership for Peace Initiative (PfP)10 – included “ensuring democratic control of 
defence forces” as one of its fundamental goals in Central and Eastern Europe (Borawski, 1995, p. 234). 
Even a cursory reading of NATO documents on enlargement will demonstrate a commitment to the development of 
a web of Euro-Atlantic structures for economic and security cooperation. The leaders of the former communist countries 
in Eastern and Central Europe, with the exception of the former Yugoslavia, all expressed interest in membership in 
NATO and the European Union (EU). Former German Defence Minister Volker Rühe spoke on behalf of many European 
politicians when he announced that there was “no reason in principle for denying future members of the European Union 
membership of NATO” (Rühe , cited in Borawski, 1995, p. 237). NATO expansion, therefore, should be viewed as a trivial 
development in European security and Euro-Atlanticism. 11  In his speeches, President Clinton emphasized that the 
inclusion of democratic (my emphasis) East and Central European countries would be the fundamental goal of NATO in 
the 1990s and into the new century (Clinton, cited in Borawski, 1995, p. 241). Zbigniew Brzezinski also pointed out that a 
“commitment to democracy and shared values” should be the primary concerns of candidates for NATO membership 
(Brzezinski, cited in Borawski, 1995, p. 243). Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott articulated that the primary reason 
for expansion to Central and Eastern Europe was to “strengthen democratization and legal institutions, ensure civilian 
control of their armed forces, liberalize their economies, and respect for human rights, including those of national 
minorities” (Talbott, cited in McGuire, 1998, p. 24). 
Many studies explore the evolution of the U.S. position on NATO enlargement. Borawski (1995), for example, 
examines how the U.S. and Russian positions on expansion changed over time and demonstrates that there was no 
consensus within the alliance on how to administer enlargement. There is a scarcity of scholarship examining the 
demand side of alliance expansion by analyzing the point of view of future NATO members. 
 
4. East or West? – Security Arrangements in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
The Cold War created a security vacuum which the newly-elected democratic governments had to address in their foreign 
policy programs. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact did not signal an end to the ex-communist countries’ association 
with the Soviet Union. The demise of the pact brought about the end of a security arrangement which could no longer 
serve the needs of its members due to a rapidly changing security environment. Formerly communist countries had three 
distinct options immediately after the end of the Cold War: provide for their own security, seek NATO membership or find 
an alternative arrangement which could include or exclude Russia. Between August 1990 and July 1992, most Central 
and East European countries had entered cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union (or Russia).12 Regardless of 
which option each country would decide to embrace, one thing was certain – the countries’ foreign policy ministers would 
have to establish peaceful relations with Russia. Peaceful relations would be imperative for Poland and East Germany 
because they had had Soviet military presence on their territory during the Cold War. The perception of threat from 
Russia was high among the Polish and Baltic people, who had experienced Soviet occupation and annexation, 
respectively. Asmus’s (2002, p. 150) historical evidence demonstrates that the initial impulse for NATO’s eastward 
expansion was to guarantee Poland’s security by curbing Russian territorial interest. Western and Polish politicians 
needed assurance that Soviet troops had withdrawn permanently. 
In a study of East European support for NATO membership, Kostadinova (2000) explores the relationship between 
support for NATO membership and distance from Russia in ten Central and East European countries. She establishes a 
statistically significant relationship between public support for NATO membership and geographic proximity to Russia, as 
well as support for membership and a history of Soviet invasion. Proximity to the source of a security threat is positively 
correlated with the perception of threat. The farther country is from the source of a security threat, the lower its incentive 
                                                                            
10 In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, skepticism regarding an active NATO role in European security was prevalent among 
U.S. policy-makers.  The Washington consensus that emerged in the first half of the 1990s converged around the Partnership for Peace 
initiative.  PfP allowed the new European democracies to participate in safeguarding European security, but it denied them the right to 
full membership.  PfP was, in effect, a plan to placate the aspiring members and keep their aspirations at bay, at least in the short term. 
11 Many of NATO’s primary documents such as the Partnership for Peace agreement and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) speak of 
Euro-Atlantic structures to refer to NATO and the EU since most of the former communist countries have applied for membership to 
both. 
12 The agreements were bilateral in nature.  Some of the countries were unable to enter an agreement with the Soviet Union prior to its 
dissolution but did sign agreements with Russia. 
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to join an alliance ensuring protection from that source. Based on Kostadiniova’s findings, Balkan countries and all 
Central European countries with the exception of East Germany and Poland should have had a fairly low security 
incentive to join NATO. 
McGuire (1998) examines the historical patterns of Russian and Soviet regional domination. He does not find 
evidence supporting Walt’s argument that states will balance against a regional security threat by allying with a regional 
hegemon. When Russia was engaged in a tug of war with the Ottoman Empire over the Balkans, “Russia’s objective was 
not to acquire more territory, but to facilitate and hasten the emergence from Turkish rule of Christian states,” (McGuire, 
1998, p. 29). When Soviet troops occupied Germany, Stalin did not have a clear agenda in mind for the communist 
satellites. The raison d’être of the Warsaw Pact was “to establish a buffer between the USSR and the resurgent 
Germany,” (McGuire, 1998, p. 30). By the middle of the 1980s, the Soviet Union had realized that Eastern Europe was an 
economic and political liability. Under Gorbachev’s leadership, the Soviet Union Communist Party lost interest in 
sustaining the relationship of economic and political dependence it had developed with the peripheral communist states 
(McGuire, 1998, p. 31). The Soviet Union had gradually been losing influence over the communist bloc before the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. The perception of security threat within the Soviet Bloc was waning even before democratic transitions 
began in 1989. 
Therefore, the perception of a security threat from Russia cannot explain the decision of non-occupied Central and 
East European countries to apply for membership. To fully comprehend the rationale for Eastern Europe’s decision to 
apply for NATO membership, one ought to examine the foreign policy formulation processes of the applicants. A second 
image argument provides a better explanation of NATO expansion than a systemic neo-realist argument focusing on 
regional security threats. 
NATO membership, from the perspective of most Central and East European state leaders, carries both material 
and symbolic benefits. The material benefits include logistical and financial support for military reform in the future 
member states (Donnelly, 1997; Donnelly, 2000). The symbolic benefits are associated with the positive image Central 
and Eastern European countries are likely to develop among Western politicians and business investors. The political and 
economic risks in a country involved in Western multilateral institutions are much lower than in untrustworthy former 
communist countries. Katzenstein has articulated important symbolic benefits of alliance membership. NATO expansion 
eastward has stretched our Cold War conception of East/West by welcoming Central and Eastern Europe in Western 
civilization. As Lippman has argued, “the nucleus of this community [NATO] is “distinct and unmistakable” based on 
geography, religion, and history,” (Lippman cited by Katzenstein and Hemmer, 2002). 
Socialist and social democratic governments were not necessarily interested in pursuing association with Western 
political structures. The material benefits were simply not high enough to convince leaders who had previously advocated 
orientation toward the Soviet Union to alter their foreign policy goals. There were no symbolic benefits of membership in 
the eyes of ex-communist politicians whose ideological beliefs were not consistent with those of leaders in the capitalist 
world. There were two main avenues toward NATO membership for Central and East European states. The first avenue, 
followed by Bulgaria, implied debilitating the ex-communists by defeating them in legislative elections. The second 
avenue, followed by Romania, implied a change in the foreign policy orientation of the ex-communists. Both avenues 
illustrate the importance of domestic politics and a government’s ideological preferences in the formulation of a country’s 
foreign policy goals. Ex-communists had a natural affinity with ex-communist Russia. Right-wing pro-reformists wished to 
disassociate their countries from the socialist legacy and sought to establish a relationship with the democratic world 
through membership in Western multilateral institutions. Some ex-communists, such as the Romanian social democrats, 
responded to the electoral incentives provided by democratic institutions and managed to stay in power by changing their 
foreign policy agenda. 
The domestic-level explanation I provide challenges systemic explanations of alliance adaptation and expansion. 
Walt’s argument that states balance against threat is not sustained by the historical evidence marshaled by McGuire. The 
perception of threat from Russia in the 1990s was not strong enough to justify NATO expansion. I claim that NATO 
eastward expansion did not become possible until ex-communists were defeated in legislative elections or changed their 
foreign policy positions. This rationalist explanation, informed by institutionalist and constructivist theories, is more 
plausible than neo-realist balance-of-power or balance-of-threat theories. It explains both the reasons for East 
Europeans’ desire to join NATO and the timing of their decision. 
 
5. The Importance of Systemic Factors: The Case of Poland 
 
Immediately after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, Polish leaders hurriedly announced that Poland would be 
interested in developing closer ties with the Alliance but would not seek full membership in it. In 1991 President Waáesa 
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declared that “Poland is not putting itself forward as a candidate for NATO membership,” (Asmus, 2002, p. 15). Following 
this cold-shoulder attitude toward the Alliance, the right-wing Center Alliance created an Atlantic Club which actively 
began lobbying for NATO membership. Only a year later, President Waáesa joined by Czech President Havel and 
Hungarian Prime Minister József Antall, publicly declared that they would pursue full-fledged membership in the alliance. 
Why did Waáesa openly endorse the idea given that 12 months earlier he had been cautious about membership? 
To complicate his efforts, the electoral victory of the left-wing coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) led to a setback in Polish ambitions to join the treaty. NATO membership did not become fully 
rooted in Polish foreign policy until a pro-NATO lobby entrenched itself in the Sejm and the Senate in 1997 (Piotrowski 
and Rachwald, 2001). Thus, the success of the Atlantic idea was not ushered in until a critical legislative lobby formed in 
both legislative chambers. The policies, which were initiated by the Waáesa Administration, were ensured continuation 
during the Presidency of Alexander KwaĞniewski. Polish diplomacy also led to a dramatic increase in public support for 
membership. Support grew gradually from 30 to 50 and later on 70 percent as evidenced by the Public Opinion Study 
Centre (CBOS) (Piotrowski and Rachwald, 2001). The case of Poland, and perhaps the Baltic Republics, illustrate the 
importance of security concerns originating in the inherently anarchical international system. Where the perception of 
threat is high, small powers will tend to bandwagon on the side of great powers, as Stephen Walt has contended. 
 
6. Foreign Policy Making in Bulgaria 
 
The discussion of Bulgarian foreign policy between 1995 and 2003 will demonstrate the following points. 13 First, the issue 
of Bulgarian membership in NATO was controversial, particularly when the communist successor Socialist Party was in 
power. Scholars’ expectations that policy makers across Central and Eastern Europe will openly embrace the idea of 
expansion are belied by my findings about variations over time in public and political support for the Atlantic idea in 
Bulgaria. Second, the foreign policy position of Bulgarian Socialist Party changed dramatically when the party leaders 
saw an opportunity to improve their party’s negative image among Western politicians. NATO membership was seen as a 
necessary condition for continued Western financial support. Third, the change in the socialists’ foreign policy position 
and the electoral success of parties which had expressed support for NATO membership spearheaded a new era in 
Bulgarian foreign policy – the era of steadfast commitment to integration in the Atlantic Alliance. 
Since NATO is a collective security alliance, the public perception of external security threats will most likely 
influence attitudes toward NATO membership. Kostadinova (2000) finds a statistically significant inverse relationship 
between public support for NATO membership and support for ex-communist parties. Her statistical result hinges on the 
assumption that ex-communist parties oppose NATO membership. Based on the historical evidence I have collected 
about the foreign policy process in Bulgaria, this assumption is upheld in the Bulgarian case.14 The Bulgarian Foreign 
Minister and his team of ministerial advisors, the Council of Ministers, and the standing committee on Foreign Policy, 
National Defense, and Security are the three political and legislative bodies participating in the foreign policy making and 
implementation process. Since the meetings of the standing committee on Foreign Policy and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs are held behind closed doors, I treat the foreign policy positions voiced by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs as an 
articulation of the decisions reached by the three bodies. The evidence I present has been collected from primary sources 
– Foreign Ministers’ speeches and Ministry of Foreign Affairs press releases – which present the foreign policy positions 
of the Bulgarian executive. The constitutional structure of the Bulgarian government does not formally assign the 
President a significant role in foreign policy making. As I will demonstrate, however, two of Bulgaria’s former presidents – 
Georgi Purvanov and his predecessor Peter Stoyanov – did play an important informal role in advancing the pro-
membership cause. 
 
 
                                                                            
13 My focus is on the period between 1995 and 2003.  Bulgaria had six foreign ministers between 1989 and 1995.  They all made a 
contribution to the development of Bulgaria’s foreign policy.  Here I only focus on the foreign ministers whose activities and viewpoints 
have been widely documented in the Bulgarian and world press.  These include Georgi Pirinski, Nadezhda Mihailova, and Solomon 
Passy. 
14 In the next section I will demonstrate that this assumption is not necessarily true in the case of Romania.  Romania’s communist 
successor party embraced the idea of NATO membership much earlier than the Bulgarian Socialist Party.  The political and legislative 
debate on NATO enlargement in Central Europe and Romania was less acerbic, and thus coalition building in favor of membership less 
costly. 
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The main communist successor party – the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)15 – was been in control of most 
Bulgarian governments between 1989 and 2009. The initial foreign policy course was determined by the BSP which won 
the plurality of the seats in the Grand National Assembly elections of 1990 and the National Assembly elections of 1994. 
Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski16 (1996-1997) and Georgi Purvanov, chairman of the BSP executive council, outlined a 
foreign policy agenda with three loosely defined goals – “European integration, regional stability, and regional cooperation 
and development” (Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 2003). The document announcing the position of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs does not even broach the issue of NATO membership. At the time Purvanov had limited the foreign policy agenda 
of the Bulgarian Socialist Party to pursuing integration in the European Union and ensuring regional stability through 
careful diplomacy with the neighboring countries. While the BSP leaders diplomatically tiptoed around the issue of NATO 
membership, another prominent politician – the Chairman of the Bulgarian Parliament Sendov – nearly jeopardized his 
political career by expressing his anti-NATO views. In 1996, in a conversation with the Russian President Boris Yeltsin, 
Sendov expressed the position that Bulgaria should not become a NATO member. Members of the pro-NATO Union of 
Democratic Forces (UDF) and Movement for Rights and Freedoms were enraged that Sendov had expressed his opinion 
on behalf of the entire Bulgarian nation. Having questioned the constitutionality of Sendov’s views and actions, the pro-
Western opposition politicians called for his resignation (Melone, 1998). 
In the middle of its term of office, the government of Zhan Videnov experienced a crisis of legitimacy instigated by 
the large export of domestically produced grain. Even though the socialist government withstood three votes of no 
confidence during its term of office, the deep schisms within its executive structures produced tensions inside the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Prime Minister Videnov and Foreign Affairs Minister Pirinski were engaged in a power squabble over 
the organization and leadership of BSP and Mr. Pirinski’s aspiration to run in the Presidential elections. Disaffected with 
the discord within BSP, Pirinski resigned from his post as foreign minister. The divisive issue of NATO membership was 
temporarily shelved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
While the BSP-led government was in shambles, President Peter Stoyanov seized the opportunity to radically alter 
the course of Bulgarian foreign policy by endorsing the NATO initiative. President Stoyanov appointed a caretaker 
government led by Sofia’s mayor – Stefan Sofianski – a pro-NATO politician. The President insisted on rapid ratification 
by Sofianski’s interim government. The decision to announce Bulgaria’s intention to apply for NATO membership was 
hasty indeed. It took the government approximately four hours behind closed doors to resurrect the forlorn NATO dream 
of the pro-reform Union of Democratic Forces. “Timing of the decision was of critical importance,” argues the ex-president 
(Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 2002). One of Bulgaria’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs – Solomon Passy – was the 
founder of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, an interest group advocating and pushing for NATO membership. The Club grew 
gradually to include members and supporters of all walks of life in spite of its original marginality. Founded in 1990, it was 
the first pro-NATO non-governmental lobby group that emerged even prior to the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. In a 
parliamentary speech Foreign Minister Solomon Passy stated that the Atlantic idea was subjected to scrutiny and 
numerous legislative votes for 13 years. 
The government of Ivan Kostov altered the foreign policy course of Bulgaria.17 After an affirmative electoral victory, 
the United Democratic Forces18 formed a new government and delegated the Foreign Ministry to Nadezhda Mihailova 
who had served on the parliamentary committee on Foreign Affairs. Foreign Minister Mihailova mapped out a new foreign 
policy course which reflected the preferences of the United Democratic Forces. NATO membership became the topmost 
priority of the new Bulgarian government along with the traditional goal of regional stability placed on the agenda by the 
outgoing socialist government. Mihailova served as Bulgaria’s spokeswoman at numerous summit meetings and 
international ministerial conventions. In 1997 she announced that “the Bulgarian government has been unequivocally 
mandated by the electorate to achieve Bulgaria’s membership of [sic] NATO,” (Mihailova, 2003). Some of the objectives 
                                                                            
15 The Bulgarian Communist Party which ruled the country between 1944 and 1989 changed its name to Bulgarian Socialist Party during 
the democratic transition.  The party has maintained a social democratic platform throughout the 25 years since the transition to 
democracy in Bulgaria.  Its foreign policy position, however, has changed steadily from close association with Russia to advocacy of 
integration in Euro-Atlantic structures.  
16 According to the early Spring 1996 Gallup polls, Foreign Minister Pirinski was the most popular Bulgarian politician with the highest 
approval ratings.  His popularity was based on popular approval for the pragmatic policies he advocated.  These policies included a 
cautious approach of non-engagement with NATO.  See Albert Melone’s account in Creating Parliamentary Government: The Transition 
to Democracy in Bulgaria. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998. p. 208 
17 The Union of Democratic Forces and its successor - the United Democratic Forces - controlled key political positions during the 36th 
and 38th National Assemblies.  It was during the 38th Assembly that the United Democratic Forces managed to change the direction of 
Bulgarian foreign policy, this time with the support of the Socialists. 
18 The United Democratic Forces (UtdDF) is a party coalition which succeeded the Union of Democratic Forces in 1997. 
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the government hoped to achieve through NATO membership is attract foreign investment and demonstrate its 
commitment to democracy and market reform. Any delay or setback in the membership negotiation process would be 
detrimental to Bulgaria’s image of an emerging market democracy (Mihailova, 2003). Based on the rhetoric of Bulgarian 
policy makers, it is clear that the incentives to join an expanding NATO were both material (attract foreign investment and 
bolster Balkan security) and symbolic (efface the negative image of the former communist regime).19 
In 1999, Purvanov denounced Bulgaria’s legislative support for cooperation with NATO’s anti-Yugoslav campaign 
in Kosovo. The lack of public support for NATO’s military action against the Serbian government provided Purvanov with 
the opportunity to publicly vent his disagreement with the foreign policy of Ivan Kostov’s government.20 He declared the 
government’s actions “anticonstitutional” and gave the Kosovo campaign a rather unpalatable label, calling it an “illegal 
war.”21 Purvanov’s foreign policy position did not change until 2000 when the BSP leader devised the new party platform 
and his presidential electoral strategy. Both BSP’s platform and Purvanov’s electoral strategy included application for 
membership in NATO and the European Union as a fundamental “strategic goal.” The radical switch in the foreign policy 
position of the Socialist Party was induced by the crisis of legitimacy experienced by the BSP-dominated government of 
Zhan Videnov in 1995-1996. This switch helped the government of Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha by ensuring swift 
passage of all legislation related to Bulgaria’s membership in the Atlantic Alliance. 
Integration into Euro-Atlantic structures became a dominant factor in Bulgarian politics in the early 2000s. The very 
survival of Bulgaria’s government at that time hinged on successful military and economic reforms, which were necessary 
for a swift accession to the European Union and NATO. A parliamentary vote of no confidence requested by the 
parliamentary group of the United Democratic Forces, led by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mihailova, was tied to the 
sluggish reform of the Bulgarian energy sector. Several documents issued by the leadership of UtdDF vehemently 
criticized the government of Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha for refusing to apply a law on closing down several reactors of 
Bulgaria’s nuclear power plant.”22 
In the next section I analyze Romania’s foreign policy to accentuate differences in the foreign policy positions of 
communist successor parties in the Balkans. These differences help explain the distinct foreign policies adopted by the 
governments of former Warsaw Pact allies. 
 
7. The Atlantic Idea in Romania 
 
It was much easier to build pro-NATO support in Romania than it was in Bulgaria. In the 1990s, Romania’s political 
landscape was dominated by the pro-reformist pro-NATO Social Democrat Party (PSD).23 Romanian politicians made 
their choice about which security arrangement to pursue as part of their foreign policy agenda. NATO membership was 
the security option parliamentary parties committed to in a 1996 appeal to the parliaments of NATO member states. 
Romania’s entire activity within Partnership for Peace, the North Atlantic Assembly [,] as well as its quest for NATO 
admission is based on the will of the people, backed by all parliamentary parties, [with the] view of becoming, as soon as 
possible, a full-fledged member of NATO structures… Romania understands [that it would] assume the rights, 
commitments, and obligations that are inherent to a NATO member. The Parliament of Romania conveys to the 
Parliament of [the member state] the assurances of its highest consideration and requests support for its endeavor as a 
free, independent, sovereign and democratic country, in compliance with article 10 of the Washington Treaty, in view of 
                                                                            
19 Some constructivists see NATO as an “organization of an international community of values and norms;” primarily democracy, liberty, 
and the rule of law.”  This view is certainly consistent with the rhetoric of politicians who have tried to push for NATO expansion.  
Intangible symbolic benefits spurred and motivated the process of NATO expansion.  For an elaboration of the constructivist perspective, 
see Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European 
Union. International Organization Vol. 55, No. 1: pp. 47-80. 
20 Ivan Kostov was one of the leaders of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) – the main coalition of pro-market reform opposition 
parties in Bulgaria.  UDF leaders heralded the Bulgarian political transition. 
21  Most of the information about Georgi Purvanov has been gathered from a comprehensive biographical database compiled by 
Fundación CIDOB – Centro de Investigaciones Internacionales y Cooperación Internacional.  The biographical database is available via 
the World Wide Web at http://www.cidob.org/  
22 “UtdDF’s motives for a vote of no confidence are different from those of the Bulgarian Socialist Party,” “Motives for requesting a Vote 
of No Confidence, November 22, 2002” and Official statement of Nadezhda Mihailova, President of the Union of Democratic Forces.  All 
documents are available in Bulgarian in the online archives of the Union of Democratic Forces.  http://www.sds.bg/  
23 The Social Democrat Party succeeded the Romanian Communist Party.  Throughout its metamorphoses the PSD has distanced itself 
ideologically from the ex-communist party. 
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becoming a full-fledged NATO member.24 
The Romanian governments and Ministry of Foreign Affairs “made EU and NATO membership a top priority and 
Romanian diplomats were working hard to make the case that their country was the “Poland of the South” in terms of 
strategic weight and regional importance,” (Asmus, 2002, p. 149). The Romanian Premier and former Foreign Affairs 
minister Adrian Nãstase of PSD announced that the Romanian government would resign if Romania’s candidacy for 
NATO membership did not get approved. About 80% of the Romanians supported the country’s membership ambitions. 
Unlike their Romanian neighbors, many Bulgarians doubted that NATO membership would be as beneficial as some of 
the political advocates claimed it would be (Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 2003). Having perceived the opportunity to 
retain parliamentary and governmental control, the Romanian social democrats openly embraced the idea of NATO 
membership and consistently pursued it since 1996 until Romani became a member in 2004. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored the issue of NATO adaptation to the new European security configuration through eastward 
expansion. Three Central European countries are already NATO members. Six more East European countries have 
begun accession talks for membership. I have presented evidence, which demonstrates that NATO was not the only 
security option post-communist societies could have chosen. NATO eastward expansion occurred because of two events: 
some communist successor parties were debilitated and politically marginalized (Bulgaria), while others supported the 
Atlantic idea to retain parliamentary and governmental control (Romania). The inclusion of Poland in NATO was not a 
surprising development – Polish constituents and policy makers needed protection from any possible territorial ambitions 
Russia might wish to satisfy. Neo-realists were unable to predict NATO expansion. Institutionalist and constructivist 
theories can account for the high level of security cooperation we have witnessed through NATO expansion. Without 
understanding the domestic political processes of post-communist Europe, however, we cannot arrive at a satisfactory 
explanation of the demand for NATO membership. The second image explanation I advance in this paper challenges 
systemic explanations of the adaptation of security institutions. 
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